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The International Labor Rights Forum was founded in 1986 and serves a unique role among human rights 
organizations as advocates for and with the working poor worldwide.  ILRF works to support the right of 
all workers to a safe working environment where they are treated with dignity and respect, and where they 
can organize freely to defend and promote their rights and interests.  ILRF has worked for two decades to 
ensure that the rights enshrined in international conventions and covenants are made real through 
effective enforcement mechanisms.  ILRF has been in the forefront of organizations working to develop 
practical and effective new tools to assist workers in winning enforcement of protections for their basic 
rights. 
The following is a description of ILRF’s four programs as well as many of ILRF’s ongoing campaigns:  
Stop Child Labor: ILRF engages in corporate campaigns to fight for an end to child labor globally. We 
are currently focusing on the cocoa industry (especially Nestle) for their use of child labor in West Africa 
and Bridgestone Firestone for child labor on their rubber plantation in Liberia. ILRF also has been heavily 
engaged in the issue of child labor in cotton and cottonseed fields. 
Rights for Working Women (RFWW): This campaign seeks to alleviate sexual harassment in the 
workplace and address other issues of concern to women workers through campaigns, worker education, 
reform of local laws, judicial advocacy, and workplace monitoring.  
Create a Sweatfree World: Through this campaign, the ILRF seeks to challenge sweatshop conditions 
globally, promote ethical alternatives and advocate for labor rights in US trade policy. The ILRF also has 
a campaign targeting Wal-Mart for abuse of workers’ rights in their suppliers’ factories. ILRF’s newest 
focus is on sweatshops in the fields as the food and agricultural supply chains become increasingly 
consolidated and riddled with unimaginable labor rights violations.  The Fairness in Flowers campaign 
raises awareness in the US about labor rights violations and health and safety problems in the cut flower 
industry. 
End Violence against Trade Unions: Throughout the world, labor activists are targets of repression for 
their organizing efforts. ILRF, in collaboration with unions and activist groups, campaigns to fight 
violence against trade union leaders globally. We participate in urgent actions to support unions, 
especially in the Philippines and Colombia which are two of the most dangerous countries for trade 
unionists.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The purpose of this report is to assess Wal-Mart’s Ethical Standards Program for its suppliers 
worldwide, as described by the company’s 2003 Factory Certification Report, 2004 Report on 
Standards for Suppliers, 2005 Report on Standards for Suppliers, and 2006 Report on Ethical 
Sourcing.  As the world’s largest retailer, Wal-Mart has a unique responsibility to ensure that 
labor rights protections apply to all its workers in all its supplier facilities worldwide.  The 
company has not invested the resources necessary to ensure that the commitments they have 
made on paper can be upheld in practice.  Some of the key points explored in the report include: 
 
• Trends in Wal-Mart’s factory auditing program:  The report documents trends in the 
company’s audit program over the past four years, including an assessment of the factory 
rating systems and flaws therein.  For example, there was a considerable decline in the 
percent of factories earning a “green” rating (for minor or no violations) from 21% in 
2003 and 2004 to a mere 6% in 2006, despite a cumulative increase in the number of 
suppliers, owners, and factory managers trained by ethical standards staff. 
  
• Assessment of the structure of Wal-Mart’s audit system:  The report documents the 
audit system’s failure to provide adequate oversight into factory operations and working 
conditions.  Minimal factory tours, interviews with workers afraid to divulge problems, 
and management manipulation of conditions prevent auditors from formulating a clear 
picture of how a factory runs during day-to-day business.  Eighty percent of audits in 
2005 were announced to factory management before auditors arrived, giving 
management a chance to clean up and coach workers.  Additionally, the absence of a 
solution-based program or a system of rewards and punishments for compliance 
compromises the audit program’s ability to motivate factories to be violation free. 
 
• Accountability in finding solutions:  The report explores Wal-Mart’s role in providing 
accountability for activities within factories that it purchases from, and its responsibility 
to find solutions as opposed to merely identifying problems.  Wal-Mart’s Ethical 
Standards Department is taking steps to put more distance between itself and its suppliers 
through participation in the Global Social Compliance Programme (GSCP), which is 
designed to cut expenditures on monitoring working conditions. 
 
• Investigation into Wal-Mart’s principles in action:  Several case studies of Wal-Mart’s 
suppliers in different countries across the globe demonstrate Wal-Mart’s worldwide 
impact on respect for labor rights.   
 
In conclusion, ILRF offers several recommendations to improve the treatment of workers in 
Wal-Mart’s supply chain and in factories all over the world.  Wal-Mart must recognize that its 
purchasing policies create a downward pressure on wages in the countries in which their 
suppliers operate and a deterioration of labor standards in an effort to fill orders.  To effectively 
address these flaws, Wal-Mart must reorganize its auditing program to enable auditors to fully 
investigate factories and gain a realistic depiction of operations.  Further, Wal-Mart needs to 
communicate and engage with all levels of the supply chain directly, from workers to suppliers, 
and take responsibility for its powerful role in the production process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Wal-Mart is currently the world’s largest retailer.  In response to concerns raised by several 
partner organizations and trade unions documenting severe labor right violations in factories 
producing for Wal-Mart, ILRF commenced a Wal-Mart “Nailed” Campaign three years ago.  
ILRF research has documented that the vast majority of Wal-Mart’s supplier factories are not in 
compliance with the company’s own Ethical Standards program.  This report further explains the 
problematic auditing system implemented for supplier factories by Wal-Mart and also the 
company’s unwillingness to take direct actions against such violations as required by its Ethical 
Standards Program.    
 
This qualitative analysis provides a comprehensive explanation of the failures of implementation 
of the Ethical Standards Program and Auditing System in Wal-Mart’s supplying factories.  ILRF 
conducted a comparative analysis from reports released by Wal-Mart regarding its auditing 
program from 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.  The report also presents two case studies of 
violations in the Chong Won Fashion factory in the Philippines and TOS Dominicana in the 
Dominican Republic.  Analysis of the case studies is supplemented by information from other 
primary sources, particularly worker testimonials from other Wal-Mart supplier factories.   
 
The purpose of this report is to prove through various data and case studies that even though 
Wal-Mart has established an Ethical Standards Program, including an auditing component, it has 
failed to enforce its own “Standards for Suppliers” (also referred to in this report as a code of 
conduct) and has not provided any incentives for improvement.  The lack of corporate 
accountability in the cases of TOS Dominicana and the Chong Won Fashion factories are 
supportive evidence of Wal-Mart’s unwillingness to take action when violations are uncovered.   
 
Section 1 of this report outlines data collected from the audit 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 reports 
released by Wal-Mart.  This section compares the different results each year and points out some 
of the most significant trends.  This section also explains Wal-Mart’s rating system, referenced 
throughout the entire report.  Section 2 describes the auditing procedures used to rate each 
factory and pinpoints the flaws in the company’s internal system of controls.  Section 3 explains 
the compliance process and the Global Social Compliance Programme, demonstrating the 
considerable gap between Wal-Mart’s paper commitments and actual supplier practices.  The 
TOS Dominicana case study is used as a supportive example.  Section 4 uses the Chong Won 
Fashion case study to further demonstrate Wal-Mart’s negligence and lack of action to protect 
workers’ rights.  The report concludes with a series of recommendations for improvement of 
Wal-Mart’s labor rights practices.  
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SECTION 1: BY THE NUMBERS 
 
As do many major corporations, Wal-Mart produces an annual report outlining its corporate 
social responsibility practices, including efforts to improve working conditions within supplier 
facilities.  Table One, below, summarizes the findings of audits (both internal and external) of 
factories supplying for Wal-Mart over the past four years.    
 
Table One:  Wal-Mart Supplier Factory Audits 2003-2006  
 
Question 2003 2004 2005 2006 
How many 
factories are 
supplying for 
Wal-Mart? 
7,700 7,600 (stopped 
doing business 
with 1,500 due to 
capability issues) 
7,200  8,873 
Number of total 
audits 
conducted 
14,750 
inspections (40 
per day; nearly 
300 per week)  
12,500 (30 per 
day) 
13,600  16,700  
How many 
were 
unannounced? 
1% 8% 20% 26% 
How many 
were rated 
Green for 
having no or 
low risk 
violations? 
21%  21%  10%  6% 
How many 
were rated 
Yellow for 
having medium 
risk violations? 
43% 43% 37% 52% 
How many 
were rated 
Orange for 
having high risk 
violations? 
36% 36% 53% 41%  
How many 
were rated 
Disapproved? 
0% 9% 1% 2% 
How many 
were Failed and 
banned from 
future orders? 
1% (103 
factories) 
1% (108 
factories) 
1% (141 
factories) 
1% 
What violations 
led to failures? 
Failures due to 
child labor, 
forced labor, 
attempted 
Most failures due 
to child labor 
issues, one due to 
forced labor 
Primarily 
underage labor 
violations 
Primarily forced 
labor and 
underage labor 
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bribery, and 
unsafe working 
conditions 
Number of 
Ethical 
Standards Staff 
104 associates 202 associates 200 assoc. 
approx. 
Over 200 
How many new 
factories? 
N/A 1,100 Approx. 2,000 N/A 
How many 
disapproved 
factories later 
reapproved? 
N/A 260 of 1,211 23  N/A 
Contractors 
used for audits 
Global Social 
Compliance and 
Interfaith 
Services 
Global Social 
Compliance and 
Intertek Testing 
Services 
Accordia, Bureau 
Veritas, Cal 
Safety 
Compliance 
Corporation, 
Global Social 
Compliance, 
Intertek Testing 
Services, and 
Societe Generale 
de Surveillance 
Only known 
contractor is 
Verité 
Number of 
Factories 
audited by 3rd 
party auditors 
35% 15% N/A 24% 
Direct Factories 
vs. supplier 
factories 
5,700 vs. 2,000 5,300 vs. 2,300 6,120 vs. 1,080 6,757 vs. 2,116 
Number of 
People Trained 
Representatives 
of 2,846 suppliers 
and 1,798 
factories 
7,900 suppliers 
and factory 
managers 
11,000 suppliers 
and factory 
managers  
5,000 suppliers 
and factory 
managers 
*session 
postponed from 
2006 to 2007* 
Most Common 
Violations 
N/A Legally required 
benefits not paid, 
working off the 
clock, double 
books, and 
incomplete 
documentation 
Legally required 
benefits not paid, 
working hours 
violations, 
overtime 
compensation, 
coaching workers 
Legally required 
benefits monetary 
or non-monetary 
value not paid, 
failure to pay 
minimum wage, 
overtime, safety 
issues.    
 
(Data obtained from 2003 Factory Certification Report, 2004 Report on Standards for Suppliers, 
2005 Report on Standards for Suppliers, and 2006 Report on Ethical Sourcing, all published by 
Wal-Mart, Inc.) 
 8
 
 
WHAT DO THESE NUMBERS TELL US? 
  
Table One summarizes key findings from reports Wal-Mart has published regarding its sourcing 
practices over the past four years.  Some trends demonstrate positive changes, such as the 
increased number of unannounced audits, but most demonstrate continued areas for 
improvement, such as the decrease in “green” rated audits in the last four years.  The purpose of 
this section is to examine what some of these data points are demonstrating.  Key findings 
include: 
 
• Decreasing Percentage of Factories Rated Green:  The number of factories rated 
green (as having no or low-risk violations) had been consistent at 21% for the first two 
years that data was available, decreased to 10% in 2005 and to only 6% in 2006.  Wal-
Mart explains the dramatic shift as resulting from increasing standards for factories.  
However, the factories had fair warning and time to improve their practices, since the 
policy to increase standards was issued in 2004.   
 
• Increasing Number of Unannounced Audits:  The number of unannounced audits 
gradually increased from 1% in 2003 to 26% in 2006, which is a significant 
improvement.  However, Wal-Mart’s goal for 2006 was to increase the percentage of 
unannounced audits to 30%, but the company reversed this commitment a year later to 
decrease the target rate again to 25%.  Wal-Mart has committed itself to monitoring 
factory conditions through unannounced audits, admitting that they give a more 
realistic picture of factory conditions and are often more useful for identifying 
violations.  So why not strive for a larger percentage of unannounced visits?  
 
• Increasing Number of People Trained by Ethical Standards Staff:  The number of 
suppliers and factory management personnel trained by ethical standards staff 
increased from 4,644 in 2003 to 11,000 in 2005, a significant increase in the number of 
people being made aware of the Standards for Suppliers.  In 2006, however, training 
was cut in half.  Only 5,000 suppliers and members of factory management were 
trained that year.  Even though Wal-Mart had increased the number of people it trained 
between 2003 and 2005, the number of factories rated green decreased and the number 
of factories rated orange jumped higher.  This suggests that education alone is not 
sufficient to ensure compliance and that the resources expended would be better 
focused on direct approaches to ensuring that violations do not occur. 
 
• Recurring Violations:  The 2004, 2005 and 2006 reports listed some common and 
repeated violations that are “related to legally required benefits not being paid,” 
“workers not being paid for all hours worked,” and “the use of double books to hide the 
number of hours worked.”  Wal-Mart describes these common violations as “Global 
Challenges and Trends.” The “double books” violation is particularly telling since it 
reveals that suppliers and factory management officials recognize that they are 
violating labor rights standards and laws.   
 
One of the challenges of analyzing Wal-Mart’s Ethical Standards program, and the extent of 
violations against workers throughout its supply chain, is the lack of accurate information 
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available to the public.  Information on sourcing policies and practices is conspicuously absent 
from the Ethical Standards Reports. It is not clear how Wal-Mart decides which factories to use, 
and it is not evident that its sourcing practices have changed to reflect a growing awareness of 
working conditions.  Moreover, there is little information on internal policies such as the amount 
of lead time given for orders and determination of length of time required to complete orders – 
both of which have considerable impact on working conditions.  Pressure of these purchasing 
policy decisions encourages excessive overtime and illegally low wages due to Wal-Mart’s 
unreasonable deadlines for orders and demands for ultra-low prices.  
 
 
FACTORY RATING SYSTEM  
 
Wal-Mart uses a “traffic light” system to rate factories as Green, Yellow, Orange, Red, or 
Disapproved, based on the number and type of violations.  Clear information on qualifications 
for each system is not publicly disclosed, and this lack of transparency to stakeholders is itself a 
serious issue.  ILRF encourages Wal-Mart to define its factory rating system for the public.  The 
little information that is publicly available is described below. 
 
Green: 
• Low risk or no violations. 
• Includes violations such as poorly lit work areas, poorly maintained restroom facilities, 
one or two missing pulley guards on sewing machines, or insufficient cafeteria capacity. 
• If a Corrective Action Plan is required: the plan is due to Wal-Mart within 90 days from 
the closing meeting date (It is unclear which of these or other violations would require a 
Corrective Action Plan.). 
• Green violations were described in Wal-Mart’s 2005 report as minor violations and the 
period before a re-audit was lengthened to one year after the initial audit; in the 2006 
report, that period was lengthened to two years. 
 
Yellow: 
• Medium risk violations. 
• Includes violations such as incomplete age documentation, violation of Wal-Mart’s 
requirement of a seventh day of rest, no pay slips given to workers, and “employees 
lifting greater than allowed loads.” 
• Must submit a Corrective Action Plan within 15 days from the closing meeting date. 
• Factory must be re-inspected within 180 days of the original inspection (which is a 
departure from the 120 days re-audit practices in 2005). 
• The most common causes of Yellow ratings in 2004 were: failure to pay legally required 
benefits, incomplete age documentation, withholding of documentation, failure to provide 
or use personal protective equipment, and inadequate fire safety equipment.  
 
Orange (Red in 2003 & 2004 Report): 
• High risk violations. 
• Violations include inadequate compensation, severe work hours violations, false record 
keeping, failure to pay legally required overtime premium, and counterfeit employee 
identification documents. 
• Must submit a Corrective Action Plan within 15 days of the closing meeting date. 
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• Factory must be re-inspected after 120 days (changed from 60 days). 
• The major cause of Red ratings in 2004 was a lack of time keeping systems, leaving 
auditors unable to verify wages and hours worked. 
 
 
Orange-Age (New Rating as of 2006 Report): 
• One or two underage workers are found to be employed by a factory.   
• Factory receives 30 days to address the violation by discontinuing the use of underage 
workers and properly compensating and repatriating the underage workers. 
• If a factory does not properly compensate and repatriate the underage workers, the 
factory is given a Red-Failed rating and banned permanently from producing 
merchandise for sale by Wal-Mart.   
• A factory is only permitted one Orange Age Assessment.  Any subsequent violation 
results in a Red-Failed rating.   
 
Disapproved: 
• Wal-Mart considers factories that do not take sufficient corrective measures as 
disapproved.  Factories that Wal-Mart rates as disapproved will not receive new orders 
from Wal-Mart. 
• According to the 2005 Report, a factory will be disapproved if it receives four Orange 
assessments within a two year period. 
• There was an increase in the penalty period for disapproved factories in 2005 from 90 
days to one year. 
 
Red (Failed in 2003 & 2004): 
• Replaced the Failed Rating in 2005. 
• Red factories are permanently banned from producing merchandise for Wal-Mart. 
• According to the 2004 report (when Red factories were labeled “Failed”), factories rated 
as Failed had serious violations related to child labor, forced and prison labor, 
transshipment, discrimination, human rights abuses, attempted bribery, or unsafe or 
hazardous working conditions. 
 
While Wal-Mart’s rating system provides auditors a starting point for monitoring factories, it is a 
vague and subjective list and open to interpretation.  There is no definition of low, medium, and 
high risk.  For example, auditors are able to decide the severity of work hours violations and rate 
the factory accordingly (as Red for severe, and Orange or Yellow for minor).  Such vague 
descriptions of the rating system, as well as the changes in the system over the past three years, 
make it difficult not only for stakeholders who want to be involved in this process, but also for 
the factory owners and suppliers themselves to keep track of violations classification. 
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SECTION 2: “VIOLATIONS WILL OCCUR” 
 
HOW HARD ARE THE AUDITORS LOOKING? 
 
Wal-Mart has repeatedly excused its own failures on the basis that auditors can not find all of the 
violations.  However, the structure of the audit system prevents auditors from having a chance to 
really look for violations. 
  
First, factory auditors do not spend enough time at a factory to really get a clear picture of how it 
runs and what violations may be occurring.  According to the 2005 Report, a factory tour to 
check on safety and question production workers on equipment and working conditions typically 
lasts about three hours, “depending on the size of the factory.”  The 2006 Report the report states 
that “a team of two auditors spends a full day auditing a factory, thus a combined time of 
approximately 16 hours is spent auditing each factory.”     
 
Further compromising the weak rating system is auditors’ lack of compliance in following the 
guidelines of the system.  Auditors are required to assess specified safety and equipment usages 
and they are also expected to talk directly to workers; yet this rarely occurs.  For example, an 
auditor for the Chong Won Fashion, Inc. factory in the Philippines decided to simply cut off 
orders because of perceived freedom of association violations.  This violation according to Wal-
Mart’s rating system does not warrant a Failed rating, but rather a Corrective Action Plan.  Even 
more alarming is that the auditor made this decision without speaking with factory workers or 
the NGOs operating in the region to determine if this was the best approach to solving the 
factory problems.   
 
In reality, the workers who are interviewed by auditors are often too scared to speak candidly 
about their conditions.  Wal-Mart itself admits that coaching of workers is one of the bigger 
problems they have identified.  With “minimal factory officials present,” workers who are least 
likely to give a bad report are those who are hand-picked for interviews.  Factory conditions have 
instilled fear in the workers, whom are hesitant to speak up against the abuse.  In the Petra 
Apparel Factory in Jordan, there have been reports of physical and verbal abuse for speaking 
during work hours.  One worker gives an account of being coached by managers before an audit 
at a factory producing for Wal-Mart in northern India:  
 
“We (workers) have to work seven days in a week. We are never paid double the 
wage for overtime since we are paid on piece rate. We always had complaints 
about low wages and working hours but we could not express it. Auditors have 
interviewed me once.  Before that the management instructed me that we 
regularly use needle and pulley guards, that we do not have overtime, that we are 
all paid very well and that all the workers are very happy.”1 
 
Although Wal-Mart believes that as “our auditors became more familiar with the factories and 
the factory workers and as the workers became more accustomed to the interview process, they 
more openly shared their experiences,” these relationships never actually form because auditors 
are rotated.  According to the 2005 report “the practice of rotating auditors allows a new 
perspective during each factory visit,” along with the practices of only seeing an auditing team 
                                                 
1 Clean Clothes Campaign, “Looking for a quick fix,” 2005. http://www.cleanclothes.org. 
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once every year or two in some instances.  It is common knowledge among the corporate social 
responsibility community that interviewing workers inside of a factory does not allow workers 
the ability to truly share their concerns.   
 
ILRF’s experience has shown that monitoring is effective only when it includes the participation 
of local grassroots NGOs and trade unions.  This develops long-term relationships with workers, 
allowing the monitoring process to identify deep rooted problems that often take months to 
expose and remediate.  Interviews of workers must also be conducted outside of the factory so 
that workers can be granted anonymity and do not feel threatened by management. 
 
Advance knowledge of audits hinders the evaluation process because it gives the management 
time to prepare, coach workers, and manipulate the factory setting.  Wal-Mart freely admits that 
unannounced audits offer a more realistic picture of factory conditions, stating in the 2004 
Report that they “introduce the element of surprise into the audit procedure and reduce 
opportunities to…potentially manipulate the audit process,” and admitted in the 2005 Report that 
they help provide a “truer snapshot of factory conditions.”  However, despite this recognition, 
only 26% of factory audits were unannounced in 2006.  While announced audits may save time 
by allowing factory management to gather the necessary paperwork ahead of time, they do so at 
the expense of workers.   
 
In order to obtain an accurate depiction of working conditions, audits do not necessarily need to 
be more frequent, but need to be longer and more thorough.  Auditors need to be able to observe 
factory and working conditions over a longer period of time to truly see how factories operate.  
Auditors also need to work with local NGOs and trade unions in order to fully understand the 
overall conditions in a given area.  Freedom of Association is a particular concern for 
monitoring: Wal-Mart’s 2005 Report recognized the “challenge of auditing this area and believe 
that non-compliance with this standard may happen more frequently than our data suggests.”   
 
Auditors need to be able to build relationships with workers so that workers feel 
comfortable telling them about violations.  Additionally, ensuring auditors are at a factory 
for more than just a few days would mean that all audits could be unannounced, since 
management would have the time to gather the necessary paperwork while the auditors 
were observing.   
 
Finally, the auditing system does not fully utilize its most compelling resource for maintaining 
ethical standards: workers.  Workers are the best auditors because they have the most incentive 
to report violations; if they could be sure that they could do so without losing their jobs, this 
would help corrective measures be more efficient.  Furthermore, if Wal-Mart was serious about 
its standards, it would recognize the imperative need to create a space for freedom of association 
as a longer term solution to identifying and solving problems at the factory level. 
 
 
NO GOALS = NO FAILURES = NO PROGRESS 
 
One of the main problems with Wal-Mart’s factory monitoring system is that no goals are in 
place to accurately measure compliance and progress.  Wal-Mart blames “a lack of clear 
consensus on how ‘progress’ should be defined” as the reason for this system.  In order to 
measure progress, Wal-Mart merely needs to set its own goals and then follow how well it is 
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meeting those goals.  By avoiding definition, Wal-Mart can define progress both as seeing an 
increase in high risk violations and a decrease in high risk violations depending on the numbers 
that year.  If the number of Orange and Red violations increase, they call this progress because it 
means that audits are more rigorous and standards are increasing.  Conversely, if the number of 
Orange and Red violations decrease, then they can argue that factory owners and suppliers are 
learning the system and following the standards better. 
 
Wal-Mart does just this in its 2004 Report on Standards for Suppliers.  Despite the fact that there 
is no discernible measure of progress, Wal-Mart claims that more factory violations are actually 
a good thing.  The Report portrays that Wal-Mart’s expanded monitoring program has resulted in 
more frequent reports of violations, following from more awareness and vigilance rather than 
“deteriorating factory conditions.”  The Report goes on to suggest that most of the important 
complaints came not through their audit system but through phone calls from workers who 
“could not share with auditors during the employee interview process.” 
 
Without any goals in place, Wal-Mart can never fail, yet can also never succeed.  Goals and 
targets are important benchmarks which help a company evaluate its business strategies.  Wal-
Mart would never say that it was unable to define progress in its retail stores.  Their Board of 
Directors, Wall Street, and the business community understand the necessity to measure 
performance.  Wal-Mart should consider its workers another key piece of their business plan 
which deserves goal setting, benchmarks and regular evaluation.   
 
 
AUDITING INCENTIVES 
 
Another problem with Wal-Mart’s auditing program is the incentive system.  Wal-Mart says that 
“the program is structured to provide motivation for improvement and bring about positive 
change at the factory level” and yet the only reward it offers for compliance is less frequent 
audits.  This does not encourage factories to be violation-free, but to only clean up just enough. 
 
For example, a factory that receives a Green rating might receive a two year reprieve from 
audits.  There would be no checkups, and they would know approximately the time of the next 
audit.  Moreover, a Green rating does not even mean that a factory has to be violation free.  A 
Green rating merely means that at the time of an announced audit, the factory had no violations 
beyond the “minor” classification. 
 
Additionally, there is the problem of what happens when the standards or local laws change and 
the factories are in their two year reprieve from audits.  How does one ensure that factories have 
changed their practices to comply with the new regulations?   
 
From 2003 to 2004 there was no change in the percentage of Green factories.  There was no 
clamor for fewer audits by modifying factory practices.  From 2004 to 2005 the percentage of 
Green factories fell to a dismal 9.6%.  In 2004 Wal-Mart Disapproved 1,211 factories due to 
infractions which they thought resulted from changes in the rigor of their Standards.  However, 
only 260 factories had the incentive to fix their problems and become reactivated.   
 
Audits may be a hassle but they do not prevent the company from doing business, and if they are 
able to fill more orders by operating at a Yellow or Orange level, there is little incentive for 
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change.  Wal-Mart goes further to try to explain the burden of audits on factories as “audit 
fatigue,” but never comments on why these audits should be considered so burdensome. 
  
Wal-Mart should create incentives that truly encourage factories to comply with their standards.  
For example, instead of extending the period between audits for factories rated Green, Wal-Mart 
should extend the length of those factories’ contract or make a promise to maintain a certain 
level of production within that factory.  Wal-Mart is an innovator in consumer marketing, in 
production, and in the retail business - they should be able to come up with an incentive that will 
truly motivate suppliers and factory owners into compliance. 
 
 
WHAT’S THE POINT? 
 
Wal-Mart may not be able to define any specific or long term goals for their audit program, but 
the company does speak briefly about the overall purpose of its Ethical Standards Program in 
vague phrases.  According to the 2005 Report, the Ethical Standards Program Objectives are: 
 
• “To encourage the adoption of ethical sourcing practices through supplier and factory 
education; 
• To monitor, through auditing, supplier and factory management practices to ensure they 
are in accordance with the Wal-Mart Standards for Supplier and the local law; and, 
• To engage stakeholders in order to continually strengthen our Ethical Standards 
program.” 
 
Wal-Mart goes on to state in the 2006 Report that it intends to: 
 
• Identify internal processes that might contribute to non-compliance with Wal-Mart’s 
Standards for Suppliers; such as short lead time for production and last minute design 
changes;   
• Increase internal alignment between social and commercial objectives, factoring labor 
compliance and social responsibility into purchasing decisions; and, 
• Reward suppliers who drive compliance throughout their supply chain but still deliver on 
quality with on-time shipping, and price with incentives in the form of future business. 
 
The 2005 stated objectives do nothing more than identify problems.  The 2006 report suggests 
that Wal-Mart is exploring more systemic purchasing processes.  However, the decrease in 
Green-rated factories suggests that in reality the company’s sourcing practices may be doing just 
the opposite.  It is too early to tell how the statements made in the 2006 report will materialize 
into any real change for workers.  In ILRF’s assessment, it will take a fundamental shift on the 
part of Wal-Mart in order to create an “internal alignment between social and commercial 
objectives.” 
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SECTION 3: “WAL-MART IS A RETAILER, NOT A MANUFACTURER” 
 
OWNERSHIP OF THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS 
 
Wal-Mart has a clear idea on who should be held responsible if factories fail to provide workers 
with proper working condition; anyone but Wal-Mart.  The company believes that “ultimately 
our suppliers and their factories must realize the benefits of improving worker conditions and 
incorporate improved standards and processes into their businesses.”  However, Wal-Mart fails 
to recognize that its purchasing policies make this difficult and in fact encourage very different 
practices.  Moreover, it sees its own role in this process as merely setting the standards and 
checking in periodically. 
 
Wal-Mart has designed its system of production to contain as many degrees of separation 
between the corporate head and factory workers as possible, leaving the middleman as the 
scapegoat.  Suppliers are the ones in charge of factories.  Factory managers are in charge of 
workers.  Third party auditors are in charge of finding violations for the majority of the products 
sold in Wal-Mart stores.   
 
The TOS Dominicana factory in the Dominican Republic is a good example of this gap between 
the retailer and the supplier.  The TOS Dominicana factory is owned by Hanesbrand and is one 
of the largest cloth-producing facilities in Central America.  The cloth is then sent to other 
factories that produce t-shirts, pants, and other garments.  Wal-Mart is the factory’s largest client, 
since they require large amounts of cloth for the facilities that produce Wal-Mart clothing.  In 
addition, Hanes supplies Wal-Mart with many products to sell to Wal-Mart stores.   
 
A summary of problems at TOS Dominicana identified through a recent investigation performed 
by the Worker Rights Consortium include: 
• Unlawful coercion of workers to sign new employment contracts and complaint waivers 
reducing workers’ employment rights and benefits;  
• Forced and unpaid overtime; 
• Verbal harassment and abuse; and,  
• Use of a range of illegal means to thwart workers’ efforts to exercise their associational 
rights.  
Wal-Mart has stated that because this is not a factory that is directly producing Wal-Mart’s own 
branded products, it assumes that Hanes will take care of all factory monitoring and remediation 
issues.  However, this case demonstrates a serious flaw in Wal-Mart’s Ethical Standards 
Department.  This is of great concern because of the significant number of companies that are 
major corporations in their own right but yet rely on Wal-Mart to bring their product to 
consumers through Wal-Mart retail operations.  Companies like Disney, Nike, and Sara Lee all 
provide products to Wal-Mart that can only be found at a Wal-Mart store, and yet Wal-Mart 
considers these products outside the purview of the auditing program.  This policy points again 
to a clear underlying theme of Wal-Mart’s purchasing policies to externalize risk whenever 
possible.  It is essential for Wal-Mart to take action in defense of the TOS Dominicana workers 
who are being routinely threatened because they decided to form a union.   
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Wal-Mart further shifts the risks more generally associated to their supply chain, resulting in 
even larger burdens on factories in order to meet all of Wal-Mart’s requirements.  This is due to 
Wal-Mart’s use of short term contracts that is further compounded by the practice of paying only 
after the order has been received.  Unfortunately the Ethical Standards Department does not 
seem to focus or even mention how these practices contribute to suppliers violating Wal-Mart’s 
code of conduct and local laws.   
 
Wal-Mart’s Ethical Standards Reports frame the company’s role as the coach for factories that 
supply for its stores.  The 2005 Report stated that “the program can only be successful if 
suppliers and factories take ownership of the compliance process.  Therefore, a goal of our 
program is to move from a policing approach to a coaching approach.” 
 
Before Wal-Mart initiates a formal relationship with a new supplier, the supplier is required to 
review and sign Wal-Mart’s “Standards for Suppliers.”  It is required to print this and provide a 
copy to each factory they use.  The factory management is then required to sign that they have 
read and fully understand the Standards for Suppliers.  Once the “Standards for Suppliers” is 
signed and returned, Wal-Mart plays no role until the first audit.  If a factory is not in 
compliance, then that is the factory’s fault.  If the factory management does not understand the 
“Standards for Suppliers,” then that is a failure on the part of the supplier and the factory owner.  
If a factory owner does not receive a copy of the “Standards for Suppliers,” then that is the fault 
of the supplier.  
 
Passive assistance and sideline direction is not enough to confront worker exploitation in 
factories.  Wal-Mart needs to use its influence to take responsibility and action to protect workers 
producing its products.  Suppliers need to be involved in the process of ensuring compliance and 
not abandoned when it comes to correcting violations. 
 
Wal-Mart is one of the largest corporations in America, and continues to profit considerably at 
the cost of workers’ rights.  Wal-Mart has a responsibility for all its products.  Education and 
audits are not enough.  Wal-Mart must have a relationship with the factory owners, not just the 
suppliers.  After all, the company has a stated “desire to be a leader in factory compliance, be 
responsive to the sensitivities of the global community, and meet the expectations of our 
customers and shareholders.”   
 
 
IS IT TOO MUCH? 
 
Throughout four of its recent reports on ethical sourcing, Wal-Mart laments how difficult its 
monitoring job is.  Wal-Mart states that “we audit more factories than any other company in the 
world.”  However, the company also uses far more factories than any other company in the 
world.  Wal-Mart is an ingenious company that has created one of the most sophisticated supply 
chains in the world.  Wal-Mart’s products make their way to Wal-Mart Stores in record breaking 
time.  Orders from Wal-Mart are shipped, tracked and received in meticulous fashion.  The 
company has found a way to ensure that a product made in America is the same as a product 
made in Bangladesh or in China.  It ensures that pieces made in Bangladesh fit with pieces made 
in Jordan and can be assembled together in China.   
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When it comes to product quality control and actual production, Wal-Mart is truly a leader.  
Indeed, Wal-Mart admits that “as a market leader, we recognize that the public expects a higher 
level of performance from us and expects that the factories we utilize follow the strict standards 
we have set for them.” The follow up to that statement is that “at the same time, the size and 
scope of our business makes the monitoring and enforcement of our standards more 
challenging.”  Wal-Mart must do more; size should not be an excuse, but rather an asset.   
  
Wal-Mart also argues that it is too difficult to monitor and enforce their standards because of the 
difficulty in overcoming inconsistent laws and the biases of factory owners.  This is especially 
relevant to problems of payment of legal wages.  Wal-Mart says that “often local overtime wage 
laws are not consistently enforced by the local government” and that “without local law 
enforcement, factory management has little incentive to pay the legal wages.” Wal-Mart chooses 
not to use its influence to step in and appropriately monitor factories to ensure worker 
protections.   
 
Wal-Mart’s potential influence upon its supply chains is documented in The Wal-Mart Effect by 
Charles Fishman. Fishman argues that Wal-Mart buys so much salmon that if it imposed and 
enforced a set of standards on how salmon was to be raised, and how salmon workers were to be 
treated, salmon farming and processing companies would be forced to comply.  Given the 
volume of purchasing and Chile’s drive to expand the supply of farmed salmon, the increased 
price of a pound of salmon would be offset by improved conditions for both the salmon and the 
workers who harvest it.2 
  
Finally, Wal-Mart claims that violations are simply too hard to find.  If Wal-Mart revamped their 
audit system more violations could be found and corrected.  It is possible to find them.  But one 
has to take the time to look beyond the surface.  ILRF recognizes that these changes will not be 
easy, but Wal-Mart has a responsibility to consumers, stakeholders and most importantly, their 
workers.  
 
 
GOING GLOBAL - THE GLOBAL SOCIAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME 
 
Wal-Mart has publicly recognized the value of adhering to ethically standards, at least on paper.  
The company’s 2004 “Report on Standards for Suppliers” claims that they want “suppliers and 
factory managers to see compliance as an investment, not as a cost, and to make the link between 
productivity and quality.” However, Wal-Mart is not following its own advice.  The Ethical 
Standards Program as a whole should be viewed as an investment, not as a cost.  Wal-Mart 
should strengthen the link between working standards and business strategies.   
 
Wal-Mart’s involvement in the Global Social Compliance Programme (GSCP) is a testament to 
its unwillingness to employ effective strategies to monitor the factories within its supply chain.  
In 2005, Wal-Mart claimed that, “as we’ve dug deeper into our supply chain, it has become clear 
that it is not efficient or cost-effective for individual retailers or brands to monitor factories.”  
  
The Global Social Compliance Programme was developed by Wal-Mart, Carrefour, Metro, 
Migros, and Tesco as a new initiative to create a unified code of best practices and cut down on 
                                                 
2 Ibid, p. 180. 
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the cost of auditing for all of the firms involved.  The GSCP is lauded by Wal-Mart and other 
business ventures as a beneficial means to improve labor standards create a new efficiency and 
cut down on costs. 
 
Wal-Mart claims that “duplication of audits by different retailers and brands also leads to 
confusion on the part of factory managers” and those factories are suffering from “audit fatigue.”  
Through their program, audits will be conducted in a given factory and rated, then that rating will 
be available to the companies that use that audited factory.  For example, if Tesco audits Factory 
X and gives it a Green rating, then Wal-Mart, who also uses Factory X, would not have to 
conduct an audit because it could use Tesco’s audit results.  However, from the information 
disclosed pertaining to the GSCP, it is difficult to determine what process Wal-Mart would take 
if and when violations found in their factories are the result of another company’s audit.   
 
The fact that stakeholders were only invited to join such a discussion of this new initiative after 
much of the original intent of the GSCP was determined, suggests that there is no real 
commitment on the part of businesses to involve trade unions and labor rights NGOs in the 
development of this new program.  Multi-stakeholder involvement is an important part of 
lending any sort of credibility to this kind of initiative; independent advocates are needed to 
express the interests and concerns of workers in ways that businesses and their suppliers cannot. 
However, to serve as a real participant in this program, a level of transparency is required that 
Wal-Mart and other companies are not prepared to give.  The GSCP says that it wants to include 
stakeholders and will take their advice into consideration, but it has already excluded such 
groups from the development of the initial code of conduct.   
 
Companies with effective monitoring programs, such as Nike, Gap, and Levi’s, are 
conspicuously absent from the GSCP.  Both Nike and Levi’s list the names of their factories on 
their website as a minimum recognition that factory disclosure is essential for supply chain 
transparency.  Information disclosure is an essential first step in committing to industry ‘best 
practices.’ 
   
The GSCP could be a more credible and effective program if it expanded its focus and developed 
plans to investigate other issues such as the following. 
 
(1) While most programs are geared towards workers in factory production, Wal-Mart’s 
supply chain also involves those that participate in the food and agricultural sector.  
Labor rights and the code of conduct need to extend to these facilities where workers are 
further taken advantage of.   According to Wal-Mart’s recent Ethical Standards Program 
fact sheet, the “GSCP covers both food and non-food production for retailers and brand 
owners.” The GSCP should engage those working on labor rights in food and agricultural 
production to capture the expertise of stakeholders as the GSCP moves forward. 
 
(2) Wal-Mart needs to make auditing information and factory disclosure available to 
stakeholders in order for the information to be verified.  NGOs and other independent 
worker advocates can be useful partners on this issue only if they are informed and kept 
as part of the process.  
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(3) Wal-Mart needs to develop a role for independent grassroots monitoring organizations 
that will provide an opportunity for short and long-term remediation given that the local 
organizations are constantly working to improve labor rights in their communities. 
 
(4) Wal-Mart has made it a public policy in the United States to not support unions, and has 
even gone so far as to create a kit with specific tools and steps to prevent employees from 
associating.  Wal-Mart and other corporations need to recognize their contradictory 
claims of a commitment to the principle of freedom of association in their supply chains 
while they undermine unions in their domestic policies.  Provisions and codes of conduct 
for all worker protections need to apply to domestic employees as well as those abroad. 
 
There is a considerable cost component to auditing and maintaining a quality ethical standards 
program.  ILRF is not advocating an increase in the quantity of inadequate audits performed.  It 
seems unreasonable to create a new organization whose only function is to cut down on 
duplication and become more cost efficient when Wal-Mart is already the member of several 
organizations that provide this function and present a more valuable representation of 
stakeholder involvement. Wal-Mart is already a member of the MFA Forum and Ethical Trading 
Initiative.  The more appropriate step would be investing its energies working with these 
established groups which also have the participation of other brands, trade unions, and labor 
rights NGOs.  By putting more time and resources into these organizations, Wal-Mart may come 
closer to cutting costs and developing an efficient, workable Ethical Standards program. 
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SECTION 4: WAL-MART STANDARDS PUT TO THE TEST 
 
Chong Won Fashion, Inc. is one of the few cases in which Wal-Mart has responded to letters of 
concern relating to the treatment of its factory workers.  By Wal-Mart’s own admission, it has 
spent more time on Chong Won than any other factory case and yet the account below shows 
how Wal-Mart did not move swiftly to address violations.  The factory ultimately closed, leaving 
hundreds of workers without a job.   
 
CASE STUDY: CHONG WON FASHION, INC. 
 
Chong Won Fashion, Inc. is a factory in Cavite, Philippines that produced No Boundaries and 
other Wal-Mart branded garments.  Wal-Mart’s relationship to this factory was through one of 
their suppliers, One Step Up.  Wal-Mart often uses companies like One Step Up to handle the 
placement of orders in various factories.  This factory, which also produced for Target and 
Mervyn’s, has had a series of violations and problems culminating in physical violence against 
striking workers.  Wal-Mart, who the factory primarily produced for, conducted several audits 
and was aware of the violations that were occurring.  Wal-Mart still chose to keep investigating 
rather than engaging in remediation. 
 
The factory had employed between 250 and 900 workers over the past six years and in 2000 they 
started a union, the Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Chong Won-Independent or “United Workers 
at Chong Won” (NMCW-Ind), to address the violations of workers’ rights.  In 2004, after four 
years of organizing and constant factory management repression, NMCW-Ind won a union 
election.  However, management contested its results for an entire year. 
 
Workers at Chong Won experienced serious violations including receiving less than the 
minimum wage and forced overtime.  The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) visited the factory 
in 2006 and found 30 to 40% of the factory’s workforce earned less than the regional minimum 
wage.  The WRC’s conclusions in this area were supported by discussions with Wal-Mart’s local 
compliance officer.  Compounding these wage violations, all of the employees shown in the 
payroll with salaries ranging between 180 and 242 pesos a day were also shown to regularly 
perform overtime (of two or more hours a day).   
 
Additionally, a series of Chong Won employee interviews showed that Chong Won workers 
have been forced to perform overtime without the right to refuse, in violation of the Labor Code 
of the Philippines.  A series of Chong Won employee interviews and examination of the 
company’s payroll records also showed that workers have performed amounts of overtime in 
excess of what is allowed under Wal-Mart’s code.  Payroll records from October 11 to October 
25, 2006 showed that some employees had performed between eighteen and twenty-seven and a 
half hours of overtime per week.  These violations include two of the most important aspects of 
any job: hours worked and pay.  Workers were forced to toil to exhaustion and then paid much 
less than the already small wages they were supposed to earn. 
  
In response to workers’ efforts to form a union at the factory, management had engaged in 
numerous acts of interference, intimidation and retaliation.  The company refused to bargain with 
the NMCW-Ind and formed a company union to try to undermine the independent union.  On 
September 25, 2006 workers went on strike and were met with further management interference 
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and physical violence as the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) police and Jantos 
security guards, armed with weapons, came to break up the workers’ peaceful picket.  The 
factory persisted in trying to break up the strike by dismissing workers engaged in the lawful 
strike and employing replacement workers, which is illegal in the Philippines; and colluding with 
police and other security personnel in the use of intimidation and violence to interfere unlawfully 
with peaceful picketing.  Many workers have been injured as a result of these interactions with 
PEZA and other armed groups attempting to break up strikes, even though the workers have been 
peaceful. 
  
Wal-Mart was made aware of this action by the Workers’ Assistance Centre, Worker’s Rights 
Consortium (WRC), International Labor Rights Forum, and Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN).  
Wal-Mart admitted to being aware of violations of minimum wage laws during previous audits 
and noted that while the violations had not stopped, they had improved.  Instead of developing a 
plan of action based on their previous audits and the WRC’s Assessment, Wal-Mart chose to hire 
Verité to perform yet another audit of the factory which took several months to be completed.   
Because Wal-Mart took several months to perform their various audits, workers continued to 
suffer violent outbreaks, sometimes resulting in hospitalization.  It is even rumored that the 
factory itself paid large sums of money to PEZA security in order to use physical violence 
against the striking workers.   
 
Although Wal-Mart has put time and resources into investigating these violations and attempted 
to mediate a solution through its supplier, it has not taken sufficient direct action.  The WRC 
recognized this in its February 2007 report on Chong Won and stated that in its view Wal-Mart’s 
“unwillingness to deal directly with the employer has contributed to his [the factory owner’s] 
lack of understanding of Wal-Mart’s demands and intentions.” 
 
When dealing with the issue of collective bargaining and the independent trade union, a key 
issue and reason for the strike, Wal-Mart has not upheld its own code to protect the principles of 
freedom of association.  The legitimate union in this case is the NMCW-Ind, which was legally 
certified in an election by the workers.  However, factory managers created a company union to 
undermine the true workers’ union.  Wal-Mart initially conferred legitimacy to this imposter 
union and dealt with it more favorably than the actual workers’ union.   
 
While Wal-Mart’s auditing program may have been able to catch some of the violations 
occurring at the factory, they clearly were not resolved.  Even as late as January 2007, a letter 
from Wal-Mart regarding Chong Won still noted that they were “monitoring the situation” and 
“will continue to investigate any reports or allegations of labor rights violations.”  
 
Although Chong Won closed in early 2007, there are many similar stories in the Philippines and 
around the world.  Wal-Mart recently signed onto a letter [Appendix B] to Philippines President 
Macapagal-Arroyo, along with seven other major retailers, expressing “concerns about 
disturbing reports of violence and threats of violence against human and labor rights promoters, 
labor leaders and workers and the alleged negative role of the Municipal and Export Processing 
Zone police in such attacks and assaults.”  While ILRF respects and supports the sentiments of 
this letter, unless it is followed up with action, it will be ineffective.  Wal-Mart must be vigilant 
about enforcement of its standards at the factory level, because change will only occur once 
factories see that they are serious about enforcing their code of conduct.  Chong Won Fashion is 
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an example of the failures of Wal-Mart’s Ethical Standards Program and auditing system to 
make a meaningful impact in preventing or resolving factory violations.   
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CONCLUSION 
  
Wal-Mart has a commitment to its shareholders, customers, and stakeholders to faithfully 
monitor and resolve issues surrounding factory conditions and worker exploitation.  Their 
Ethical Standards Program is a first step, but after 15 years of program development and 
experience, Wal-Mart’s monitoring program should be more sophisticated and effective.    
 
To add credibility to its monitoring program, Wal-Mart must acknowledge that it is no longer 
sufficient for ethical standards to be an afterthought and a method to improve public relations 
and image.  Ethical standards must be incorporated into the business strategy and tackled with 
the same innovation and competitiveness as they bring to other areas of their operations.  Wal-
Mart must recognize that their purchasing polices are a part of the problem, encouraging wage 
and hours violations.  Insufficient lead time for orders and unreasonable demands on price 
translate to excessive, forced overtime and wages less than the legal minimum wage. 
 
Wal-Mart’s auditing program should be significantly modified so that auditors have the time and 
tools to accurately report on what goes on in the day-to-day workings of a factory.  Incentives 
need to be changed so that they correctly reflect the needs and desires of management and 
owners.  Incentives will provide the motivation to change - the motivation to be violation free.  
Progress needs to be defined and the program evaluated by a consistent set of standards so that 
progress can be tracked.   
 
Corporate responsibility must come from the top; Wal-Mart should accept its role in the process 
of creating and maintaining adequate factory conditions.  Problem solving and active 
participation need to become the goals of the Ethical Standards program.  Additionally, Wal-
Mart needs to recognize its suppliers and factories as partners and stick by them to see solutions 
through rather than cutting out when the going gets tough.  Incorporation of workers into the 
audit process and increased transparency will also help solve monitoring problems and lend 
credibility to the program.  Workers, when informed of their rights, are the best auditors because 
factory conditions have a direct impact on their lives.   
 
Finally, Wal-Mart must commit itself to transparency with real, multi-stakeholder involvement 
and protect freedom of association.  NGOs do not strive to be the enemy of business; they want 
to facilitate the monitoring process and help find new ways to address these age-old problems.  
Unions also are not designed to bankrupt corporations; they need the company to keep members’ 
jobs.  NGOs and unions can be effective partners if Wal-Mart accepts that they are a part of the 
process. 
 
Chong Won is a perfect example of the failures of Wal-Mart’s Ethical Standards program.  When 
presented with a situation of increasingly disturbing violations of workers rights, Wal-Mart 
continued its investigations for six months, even while workers continued to be beaten and 
threatened.  The company refused to disclose information to stakeholders involved with aiding 
the workers and ignored advice from others.  Even after its final investigation was complete, the 
company wasted no time making its recommendations to One Step Up so that it could extricate 
itself from the situation.  It seems that Wal-Mart only wants to identify problems and then report 
on them so that it appears to the public as if it is actually accomplishing something. 
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Wal-Mart needs to make serious changes to address deficiencies in how it deals with workers in 
their supply chain and in factories all over the world.  Wal-Mart grew to become the world’s 
largest retailer, and continues to post record profits, based on the hard work of production 
workers in factories that are unsafe, that push workers to exhaustion and continue to underpay 
them.  ILRF recommends the following specific actions to reform these corrupt practices.   
 
• Enforce the Wal-Mart Code of Conduct. Wal-Mart must make good on its promise and 
collaborate with worker representatives to develop a system that will ensure the effective 
implementation of the Wal-Mart Code of Conduct.  Wal-Mart must communicate to all of 
its suppliers that it is serious about enforcing its code of conduct.  Further, workers must 
be made aware of their rights under the code, and labor rights advocates must be given 
access to Wal-Mart suppliers to verify the actual conditions facing workers, and to 
participate in establishing true independent monitoring that is not on Wal-Mart’s payroll.  
 
• Provide a Dispute Resolution System.  Wal-Mart, like many multinational corporations, 
chooses to outsource production of its goods from countries like China and Bangladesh, 
where labor is cheap and local labor laws are not enforced.  If workers lack access to 
courts to enforce their rights, then the rights become mere aspirations. Wal-Mart takes 
advantage of this situation by asserting their inability to reform the laws and practices of 
entire countries.  But Wal-Mart has assured the public that it will make sure that the 
workers at its suppliers will get the benefits of local laws. The only way to do this in the 
absence of a functioning legal system is to introduce a complaint-driven enforcement 
mechanism that allows workers to issue grievances to some independent body about their 
failure to receive the benefits promised by Wal-Mart’s code of conduct.  This entity must 
have the power to require Wal-Mart to provide immediate remediation. Workers and 
allied organizations must insist upon participation in this process to ensure that it 
provides a workable mechanism to deliver to workers the benefits of the code, but 
likewise protects them from retaliation.  
 
• Reform the Pricing Process and Commit to Long-Term Relationships with 
Suppliers.  Wal-Mart is notorious for pressuring its suppliers to provide prices that could 
not possibly allow an ethical supplier to comply with basic labor laws on issues like 
minimum wages and maximum hours.  In addition, Wal-Mart refuses to make long-term 
commitments to its suppliers, and instead constantly shifts production to new factories 
when its pricing demands are not met.  The result of this “low costs at any cost” approach 
is that the workers ultimately are forced to pay the price.  Wal-Mart’s sourcing practices 
exacerbate worker exploitation as the suppliers know that Wal-Mart will simply “cut and 
run” if they fail to provide goods at the prices demanded.  Wal-Mart must reform its 
pricing practices to require and ensure that the prices provided to suppliers would still 
allow workers to receive the benefits of Wal-Mart’s code of conduct, as well as all 
applicable laws and regulations.  Workers and allied organizations must demand that 
Wal-Mart systematically raise payments to suppliers to enable them to pay workers a 
living wage, and provide them with additional benefits as guaranteed by law as well as 
commit to long-term sourcing from its suppliers.  Further, Wal-Mart should make long-
term commitments to suppliers, and only terminate relationships with suppliers when no 
viable economic alternative exists or when a supplier has repeatedly refused to remediate 
serious code of conduct violations, as verified by credible independent human rights 
advocates. 
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• Provide Restitution to Wal-Mart Sweatshop Workers. Wal-Mart recognizes, at least 
internally, that its suppliers are not providing the most basic rights to their workers, 
including paying at least minimum wages and refraining from forced and uncompensated 
overtime.  Hundreds of thousands of sweatshop workers around the world have 
subsidized Wal-Mart’s enormous profits with their uncompensated labor.  Wal-Mart must 
compensate these workers for their back wages and benefits that were unlawfully denied.  
 
• Commit to Sourcing From Union Shops and Worker Co-Ops Worldwide.  Wal-Mart 
and other global corporations have undermined democracy in the workplace around the 
world through strategies of union-busting.  Wal-Mart must make a public commitment to 
increasing from year to year the percent of its product that is sourced worldwide from 
factories and farms with democratic unions in place or that are democratically-organized 
cooperatives.  Wal-Mart must ensure that all contractors respect workers’ right to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining.  Wal-Mart should not tolerate any 
harassment, intimidation or retaliation against employees for exercising these rights.  If 
workers attempt to organize a union, Wal-Mart should not allow employers to intimidate, 
coerce, threaten, or make promises to employees in an attempt to convince them to reject 
the union. 
 
• Monitor, Punish and Eliminate Discrimination Against Women in Supplier 
Factories.  The majority of goods made in sweatshops overseas for Wal-Mart are made 
by a workforce dominated by poor, young women.  Women in these factories face unique 
challenges in addition to the horrendous working conditions and grossly inadequate pay 
with which all workers are forced to contend.  They also face increased discrimination in 
hiring and firing, sexual harassment (including rape on the factory floor), forced birth 
control as a condition of work, as well as denial of nationally recognized pregnancy 
benefits and maternity leave.  Wal-Mart must pay special attention to these violations and 
should be held responsible for the condition of women workers in their supplier factories. 
 
• Pay a Living Wage.  Current minimum and prevailing wages in the industry fall far short 
of what is required for workers to meet their basic needs for nutrition, housing, clothing, 
healthcare and education.  Wages are kept low by Wal-Mart’s constant pressure on 
suppliers to cut prices, making the payment of a livable wage impossible.  Wal-Mart must 
commit to the payment of a living wage in each of its supplier factories by paying these 
suppliers sufficient prices to allow workers to receive a living wage, and requiring that 
suppliers pay wages sufficient to meet workers’ basic needs.     
 
Wal-Mart may be a retailer, but it can also mean so much more than that.  Wal-Mart can make a 
difference, but only if they try. 
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Appendix A: Factory Profiles 
 
Petra Apparel Factory 
 
Who owns it:  Mr. Ahmed Nuseriat 
What they produce: Blue jeans for women and children 
Who they produce for: Wal-Mart and Gloria Vanderbilt 
Address: Ad Dulayl Industrial Estate, Plot #25 
     Zaqua, Jordan 
Number of workers: 850+ 
 
Summary of Problems at the Factory: 
• forced and unpaid overtime 
• failure to pay the legally mandated premium for work 
• verbal harassment and abuse   
 
Average rate of pay:  $0.46/hour 
 
Work Schedule: 8am to 8pm 
 
Reports/More Information about Factory:  
• National Labor Committee March 2006 Report 
http://www.nlcnet.org/documents/Jordan_PDF_Web/32_Petra.pdf 
• Wal-Mart’s Standards for Suppliers 
http://ilrf.org/projects/corporate/walmart/Supplier-Standards-2005.pdf 
 
Code of Conduct Violations:  A report prepared by the National Labor Committee 
(www.nlcnet.org) on the working conditions of the factory revealed that Petra had violated 
Jordanian laws as well as the Wal-Mart Standards for Suppliers (March 2006). 
 
Working Hours: Twice a week the company forced workers to work mandatory all night (20 ½ 
hour shifts) from 8am to 4:30am the following morning to meet production deadlines.  It is not 
unusual for workers to spend 89 hours per week at the factory.  They also received only one or 
two days off a month, even though they are supposed to have off every Friday.   
 
Abuse:  Workers have reported verbal and physical abuse including beatings, slapping and 
punching.  They were routinely hit for making mistakes, for speaking during working hours, or 
for taking too long in the bathroom. 
 
Pay:  Workers are paid 21% below the legally-mandated minimum wage.  They received $0.46 
an hour when they should have received $0.58 an hour.  This means that sewers who take 27 and 
a half minutes to make a pair of jeans are paid only $0.21 per pair.  Moreover, they are not paid 
the 25 to 50% overtime premium for extra hours and the penalty for a taking a LEGAL sick day 
is the loss of three days of wages.  The lack of pay-slips or time-cards also makes it easier for the 
company to take advantage of workers because it makes it harder for them to keep track of their 
hours worked. 
TOS Dominicana 
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Who owns it:  Hanesbrand Inc. 
What they produce: Fabrics primarily for t-shirts 
Who they produce for: Wal-Mart is their largest client, but they also produce for University    
logo goods maker Grupo M, and their own blank t-shirts 
Address: Textile Factory 
    Dos Rios Industrial Park 
    Bonoa, Dominican Republic (DR) 
Number of workers: 1,100 workers (one of largest textile manufacturers in the DR) 
 
Summary of Problems at the Factory: 
• unlawful coercion of workers to sign new employment contracts and complaint 
waivers reducing workers employment rights and benefits 
• forced and unpaid overtime 
• verbal harassment and abuse 
• use of a range of illegal means to thwart workers’ efforts to exercise their right to 
association.   
 
Union Information:  Workers have tried to join the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa de 
Dos Rios/Hanesbrand, TOS Dominicana (Union of Workers of the Enterprise Dos 
Rios/Hanesbrand, TOS Dominicana) a local branch of the national union, the  Federacion 
Dominicana de Trabajadores de Zonas Francas or FEDOTRAZONAS (Dominican Federation of 
Free Trade Zone Workers).   
 
Communication with Buyers: The Worker Rights Consortium notified Hanesbrand about these 
issues and the violations were neither acknowledged nor addressed (as of their report on June 6, 
2007). 
 
Reports/More Information about Factory:  
• WRC Report on TOS Dominicana 
http://www.workersrights.org/Freports/TOSDominicana_Report_06-06-07.pdf 
• Wal-Mart Watch Article 
http://walmartwatch.com/blog/archives/look_who_hanes_has_got_their_labor_rights_vio
lations_on_now/ 
• Hanesbrands Code of Conduct 
http://www.hanesbrands.com/hbi/Resources/GlobalStandardsforSuppliers.pdf 
 
Code of Conduct Violations:  In a series of investigations of the working conditions of the 
factory on October 29-31, 2006, February 9-12, 17-19, and 26-28, 2007, and May 10-12, 2007, 
the Worker Rights Consortium (http://workersrights.org) found that Hanesbrand was in violation 
of Dominican and International laws. 
 
Working Hours:  Article 147 of the Dominican Labor Code establishes that the regular work 
week is to be eight hours per day and no more than forty-four hours per week.  Article 203 of the 
Labor Code establishes that any work beyond this amount is to be compensated at a rate of 135% 
of normal pay and that overtime work is to be voluntary.  However, TOS Dominicana makes 
employees work a schedule which requires unpaid overtime.  Workers are forced to work daily 
12 hour shifts (for four days straight) as a mandatory aspect of employment.  In addition to 
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illegally forcing workers to work a 12 hour day, the company is also not paying them the 
overtime rate for the extra hours they work. 
 
Verbal Abuse:  Managers on repeated occasions screamed at workers using derogatory and 
insulting language.  The workers most frequently identified one particular supervisor and one 
particular manager as behaving in this way.  Some workers complained that they feel that they 
are treated like “animals” in the workplace.   
 
Unionization:  Worker’s rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining are protected 
by Dominican law, international law, and applicable codes of conduct.  Article 333 of the 
Dominican Labor Code bars employers from engaging in practices that impede workers’ efforts 
to join in trade unions.  Some of the actions taken by the company include threats and 
harassment, surveillance of workers’ activities, the mass dismissal of union members, and the 
repeated targeted dismissal and attempted dismissal of union officers.  In one instance union 
members were targeted for mass dismissals; between April 12 and 16, TOS Dominicana 
terminated 31 employees, and of those 31 workers, 29 were union members.   
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Chong Won Fashion, Inc.  
 
Who owns it:  Mr. Yong Ryul Kim 
What they produce: Garments, casual women’s and men’s apparel 
Who they produce for: primarily produce for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc and its supplier One Step 
Up, though Target, American Eagle and Mervyn’s have had production recently 
Address: South Avenue 
    Cavite Export Processing Zone 
    Rosario, Cavite, Philippines 
Number of workers: Workforce fluctuated between 250 and 900 in the past six years. 
 
Summary of Problems at the Factory: 
• minimum wage violations 
• forced overtime 
• violations of workers’ right to unionize and bargain collectively 
• collusion by factory management with government agents in violence against 
workers engaged in a lawful and peaceful strike 
 
Union Information: Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Chong Won-Independent or “United 
Workers at Chong Won” (NMCW-Ind), the union legally authorized to represent Chong Won 
employees. 
 
Communication with Buyers:    
• According to university disclosure data, Chong Won has produced multiple orders of 
university logo apparel for Oarsman Sportswear as recently as October of 2006; however, 
when the WRC contacted Oarsman, company representatives claimed that they could not 
determine whether they had used the factory.  Oarsman has not acknowledged 
responsibility for code of conduct compliance at Chong Won and has played no role in 
efforts to address labor rights violations at the factory. 
• The WRC findings were conveyed to Chong Won in November 2006 and also shared at 
that time with Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart and the other buyers have failed to take meaningful 
action to compel Chong Won to cease its violations of worker rights. 
• Additionally, Wal-Mart’s own audits of Chong Won yielded findings consistent in key 
areas with the WRC’s, but Wal-Mart has failed to take effective action.  On November 
17, 2006, Wal-Mart announced to the Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), the 
International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF), and the WRC that it could apply no additional 
pressure and would make no further specific requests for corrections until it could 
conduct another investigation of the case. 
 
Average rate of pay: The regional minimum wage is 272 pesos (US$5.53) a day.  However, 30-
40% of workers at Chong Won receive less than this. 
 
Reports/More Information about Factory:  
• WRC Report on Chong Won 
http://www.workersrights.org/Freports/Chong_Won_Report_2-21-07.pdf 
• Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Individualcompanies/C/ChongWon 
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• Wal-Mart’s Standards for Suppliers 
http://www.walmartstores.com/Files/SupplierStandards.pdf 
 
Code of Conduct Violations: In a series of on-site investigations of the working conditions of 
the factory between Oct 28 and Nov 2, 2006, the WRC (http://workersrights.org) found that 
Chong Won was in violation of international laws, Filipino laws, and Wal-Mart’s Standards for 
Suppliers. 
 
Minimum Wages:  At the time the WRC visited the factory, 30 to 40% of the factory’s 
workforce earned less than the regional minimum wage. These workers received salaries ranging 
from 180 to 242 Philippine pesos (US$3.66 - 4.96) for a standard eight-hour workday. The 
regional minimum wage is 272 pesos (US$5.53) a day.  The WRC’s conclusions in this area were 
supported by discussions with Wal-Mart’s local compliance officer, who stated that audits the 
retailer had previously conducted at Chong Won had yielded similar findings concerning failure 
to pay the minimum wage and excessive use of apprentices. 
 
Working Hours:  All of the employees shown in the payroll with salaries ranging between 180 
and 242 pesos a day are also shown to regularly perform overtime (of two or more hours a day).  
Additionally, Chong Won workers had been forced to perform overtime without the right to 
refuse, in violation of the Labor Code of the Philippines.  Workers had performed amounts of 
overtime in excess of what is allowed under university codes of conduct and under Wal-Mart’s 
code.  Payroll records as recent as October 11 to October 25, 2006 showed that some employees 
had performed between eighteen and twenty-seven and a half hours of overtime a week. 
 
Unionization:  Chong Won management had engaged in numerous acts of interference, 
intimidation and retaliation against workers seeking to exercise their right to unionize and 
bargain collectively.  Management violations included: dismissing workers engaged in a lawful 
strike; employing replacement workers during a lawful strike, which is illegal in the Philippines; 
colluding with police and other security personnel in the use of intimidation and violence to 
interfere unlawfully with peaceful picketing; attempting to prevent workers from participating in 
an official union certification election; refusing to comply with the binding directives of the 
Filipino Department of Labor and Employment; refusing to bargain with a duly constituted 
union, as required by Filipino law; demoting and transferring union officers in a retaliatory 
manner; and illegally aiding the founding of a company union in order to undermine a duly 
constituted union. 
 
Violent Response to Legal Strike:  Chong Won employees had been subjected to violence and 
harassment by agents of the company and PEZA in retaliation for engaging in a lawful strike and 
picket.  When the picketing workers refused to disband, guards hired by the company attacked 
the striking workers. During the melee, more than 40 workers, the strong majority of them 
women, were struck by the guards with bamboo clubs. As a result, fourteen workers suffered 
serious injuries to their heads, arms, and legs.  Further incidents resulted in more injuries and 
unduly interfered with the lawful strike.  Moreover, Chong Won sought to terminate the 
employment of 116 workers who participated in the factory-wide strike.  The workers were 
given “notice of termination” on September 30, 2006. 
 
Illegal use of Contract Workers:  By law, contract workers may not be members of a union. 
Since Chong Won has been hiring primarily contract workers from late 2004 (which is when 
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workers voted to unionize) through the present time, and assigning to these workers the regular 
work of the factory, Chong Won management has caused the membership of the union to be a 
fraction of the size it would otherwise be, thus undermining the union’s strength and bargaining 
power. In so doing, management has violated both Filipino law and the freedom of association 
provisions of applicable codes of conduct because Filipino law prohibits the use of contract 
workers to perform the functions of regular employees. Additionally, worker interviews, 
company payroll records and individual employee files show that many contract workers at 
Chong Won have been held in contract status beyond the legal time limit of one year. 
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Guangzhou Winbo Industrial Co., Ltd. 
 
Who owns it:  Winbo Industrial.Co., Ltd. 
What they produce: writing utensils, gifts, household products, bags, etc.   
Who they produce for: primarily produce for Wal-Mart  (Tom & Jerry’s), McDonald’s, Coca 
Cola, Pepsi, Disney, Hello Kitty, Snoopy, Sesame Street, Garfield, Harry Potter, Barbie Dolls, 
Haier, Hooligan Rabbit, Hard Rock, Carlsberg, Grants, Tarzan, etc.   
Address: Guangzhou Winbo Industrial Co., Ltd  
    No.3, Zhenzhong Rd. 
    Shenshan Industrial Area 
    Jianggao Town, Baiyun District 
    Guangzhou 
    Guangdong 
Number of workers: More than 800 employees 
 
Summary of Problems at the Factory: 
• Labor Contracts violations 
• Wages being withheld. 
• Minimum wage violation 
• Excess hours with no pay 
• No paid holidays or rest days 
• Salaries are not disbursed in a timely manner 
• Labor Safety violations 
• No Social Insurance, pensions, work injury insurance or medical insurance for 
employees.   
• No Labor Unions 
• Collective strikes result in high fines and leaders being fired.   
 
Union Information: No Labor Unions 
 
Average rate of pay: Salary Slips from Winbo in hourly wage payments ranges from 15-24 
Yuan per day.  Most workers’ base salary is 15 Yuan per day ($1.80).   
 
Reports/More Information About Factory:  
• International Labor Rights Forum 
www.ilrf.org/press/Wal-Mart/China%20Report%20Press%20Release101206.pdf  
 
• China Labor Watch 
www.chinalaborwatch.org/2007FinalWorkInjuryReport.pdf  
 
• Wal-Mart’s Standards for Suppliers 
http://www.walmartstores.com/Files/SupplierStandards.pdf 
 
Code of Conduct Violations: Winbo Industrial Co., Ltd is in violation of the Chinese Labor 
Law, the Guangdong Province Wage Payment Regulations, the Safe Production Law and the 
Wal-Mart “Standards for Suppliers.”    
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• Minimum Wages: 
Standard minimum base salary used in hourly wage payments is 37.284 Yuan per day ($4.73) as 
stated by local government.  However, most workers receive 15 Yuan per day ($1.80) and most 
workers are not paid hourly but instead their salary is calculated by piece-rate.  Under this 
method, workers are paid based on how many items they produce in 8 hours.  They do not 
receive a base salary even though the law stipulates that all full time employees (8 hours a day) 
must have a base salary.   
 
• Working Hours: 
A normal work day consists of 8 hours.  Labor Law requires that the overtime be paid at a 1.5 
regular wage rate.  Winbo Industrial Co., Ltd does not pay for rest days or holidays.  The factory 
does not pay double or triple salary for working on days of rest 
 
• Unionization: 
There is no labor union in the Winbo Factory.  It is easier for the management to violate the 
workers’ rights.   
 
• Violent Response to Legal Strike: 
In 2005, 150 workers participated in a collective strike in the sewing machine workshop due to 
the factory’s illegal withholding of the workers’ salary.  In March 2006, 50 workers went on 
strike again due to the low rate salary of piecework.  The leader was written up for serious 
misconduct, fined 500 Yuan and fired.  Every strike has resulted in the termination of the lead 
organizer.   
 
• Illegal use of Contract Workers: 
Workers are required to leave their ID cards with factory management for a week when they 
interview.  The factory signs labor contracts but does not provide the worker with a copy of their 
contract.  Therefore the worker can not dispute any issue that might arise to hold the company 
responsible.  The factory has each worker sign a 3 ½ year employment contract in order to keep 
its skilled workforce for longer.  The factory regulations require 20% of these workers’ wages to 
be withheld until the contract expires.  If the worker chooses to leave the factory before then, the 
wages will not be returned.   
 
 34
Appendix B: Letter to Philippines President Macapagal-Arroyo from Wal-Mart, et al. 
 
August 3, 2007 
 
HE Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 
President, Republic of the Philippines 
Malacanang Palace 
JP Laurel Street, San Miguel, Manila 
1005 Philippines 
Fax: (+63 2) 736-10-10 
Email: corres@op.gov.ph 
 
Dear Honourable President Macapagal-Arroyo: 
 
As companies that source apparel products from the Philippines, we are writing to follow up on a 
letter of November 7, 2006, wherein the signatory companies, including many of the signatories 
to this letter, expressed their concerns about disturbing reports of violence and threats of violence 
against human and labour rights promoters, labour leaders and workers and the alleged negative 
role of the Municipal and Export Processing Zone police in such attacks and assaults. (Copy of 
the November 7, 2006 letter attached as Annexure 2.) 
 
The November 2006 letter had called upon your government to look into the matter and take 
proactive measures for ensuring the physical safety and for protecting the rights of the workers 
and labor rights promoters. 
 
Unfortunately, we feel compelled to reach out to you again regarding concerns about alleged 
attacks and death threats against striking workers at the Chong Won factory, now known as 
C.Woo Trading, in the Cavite Export Processing Zone. 
 
Based on the attached report, we are extremely concerned about the safety of the workers, as 
well as the safety of labour rights advocates who have been providing them support and advice. 
 
Please note that many of the companies that have added their names to this letter have never 
sourced products from this particular factory, however, we are all concerned that these alleged 
incidents appear to be part of a larger pattern of harassment and violence against workers, labour 
leaders and human rights promoters that could discourage companies from doing business with 
your country.  
 
We would therefore strongly urge your government to immediately launch an independent 
investigation into these incidents and ensure immediate steps to ensure safety of the striking 
workers and labour rights promoters who are providing support to those workers. 
 
As was noted in the earlier letter as well, it is imperative that companies doing business in the 
Philippines remain confident in the government's commitment to freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and the rule of law. 
 
Sincerely, 
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Guy D. Bradford, Vice President 
Corporate Responsibility and Customs Compliance Officer 
American Eagle Outfitters 
BradfordG@AE.com 
 
Dan Henkle 
Senior Vice President of Social Responsibility 
Gap Inc. 
Dan_Henkle@gap.com 
 
Laura Wittman, Vice President 
Compliance and Human Rights 
Jones Apparel Group 
LWittman@jny.com 
 
Daryl Brown, Vice President 
Business Ethics and Compliance 
Liz Claiborne 
Daryl_Brown@liz.com 
 
Marcela Manubens, Vice President 
Global Human Rights & Social Responsibility Programs 
Phillips-Van Heusen 
MarcelaManubens@pvh.com 
 
David M. Uricioli, Senior Director 
Global Human Rights Compliance 
Polo Ralph Lauren 
David.Uricoli@PoloRalphLauren.com 
 
Ron Martin 
Director of Social Compliance 
VF Corporation 
Ron_A_Martin@vfc.com 
 
Rajan Kamalanathan 
Director of Compliance, Global Procurement 
Wal-Mart 
Rajan.Kamalanathan@wal-mart.com 
